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THE SMART BORDER: FOOD SAFETY AND BIOTERRORISM
John McNamarat

Canadian Speaker
I am very pleased to be here this morning. Yesterday we heard excellent
presentations on the new realities of the relationship between our two
countries since September 2001. The reality still takes into account the fact
that we have the largest border of any two countries in the western
hemisphere and on a day-to-day basis we trade more with each other than
any other trading partners. The presentations detailed issues related to
security and sovereignty, our existing trade agreements, and the movement of
people and goods across borders. They presented a theorem of which what
our two governments have been doing and this has impacted people and
businesses involved in the cross border trade. It is my intention to focus on
what is being done primarily in Canada, but to some degree in the U.S. and
to deal with the fundamental question, how do we protect our common food
supply from the very real threat that terrorism poses?
COMMON FOOD SUPPLY
This point about our food supply being a common food supply needs to
be stressed at the outset. It is arguable that no two other countries in the
world have such an intertwined system of supplying food to their consumers.
In 2002, our total bilateral trade in agri-food products was 30.6 billion
Canadian dollars. About two out of every three dollars of Canada's agri-food
imports and exports was accounted for by the U.S. market. Our trade since
the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement has, except for a few products, no or

John D. McNamara is president and founder of McNamara and Associates, a consulting
firm that practices in the areas of finance, market development, strategic planning and
communications. He served as president of the Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), the
world's largest agriculture company, from 1999 to 2002. Prior to being elected President of
ADM, he spent sixteen years with ADM providing leadership to its Canadian operations as
President of ADM Agri-Industries, followed by his promotion to Group Vice President of
ADM and President, North American Oilseed Processing Division. Mr. McNamara has served
as Director of the National Oilseed Processors Association, Chairman of the Canadian Oilseed
Processors Association, and Director of the Canola Council of Canada and the Canadian
Institute of Edible Oils. Mr. McNamara completed his formal education in Chemical
Engineering at Ryerson University in Toronto, Ontario.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:205

very low tariffs.' As a consequence, food businesses have become focused on
making decisions about where to source and where to process food products
based on competitive advantage, seasonality, and fundamental business
economics. It is truly a continental marketplace.
In coming to the subject of food safety and bioterrorism, we start with a
situation where there is significant integration and a very large daily trade.
Our common food supply is, indeed, a matter of our common economic
interest. Bioterrorism is certainly a real threat to our food supply. Earlier this
year, the World Health Organization released a report that begins with the
following statement: "The malicious contamination of food for a terrorist's
purposes is a real and current threat. And the deliberate contamination
of
2
food at one location could have global public health implications.",
The emergence of malicious contamination as a threat to our food supply
has come as a shock to North America. We are blessed with a plentiful
supply of an amazing range of food products being readily available in our
grocery stores and our restaurants. Our dinner tables benefit from the
proverbial horn of plenty, because they are now supplied from northern,
southern, eastern, and western hemispheres 12 months of the year. This is a
great accomplishment on the part of farmers and the food industry, both here
in North America and elsewhere. However, our good fortune also puts us at
risk. We depend on a global supply of food, not just our local one. Our food
comes from over great distances and travels along a complex food chain. It is
handled, transformed, packaged, shipped, reshipped and redelivered and
handled many times before you or I consume it. Each step in the process
increases its vulnerability.
It is equally true that domestic products travel great distances. This too
creates vulnerability as a shortfall in production or a malicious act can impact
the whole country from a single source of supply. Deliberate contamination
of our food supply with chemical, biological, or radionuclear agents can
occur at any vulnerable point along the food chain from input manufacturer,
primarily producer, processor, and final marketing at retail or at food service.
It has happened, not frequently to be sure, but it has happened. The
following are a few examples cited in the reading resource materials that I
have reviewed in preparation for this presentation.

1 Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
2

Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and Strengthening Prevention

and Response
ORGANIZATION,

en/terrorist.pdf

Systems, Executive Summary, UNITED NATIONS WORLD HEALTH
Jan. 2003, available at www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/generalU

McNamara-FoodSafety and Bioterrorism

2003]

CASES OF BIOTERRORISM
In 1978, a radical group in the Middle East used mercury to poison Israeli
oranges. 3 Exports were reduced by 40 percent, and at least a dozen people
were injured from eating the product. In 1984, here in the United States a
group of cult members in Oregon contaminated salad bars with Salmonella
causing 700 cases of Salmonellosis and appeared to be a trial run for a more
extensive attack, one that would possibly have introduced typhoid fever.4
These are other cases that have occurred in Canada and China by militant
groups or disgruntled employees. These are examples that demonstrate how
easily a determined group or an individual could maliciously contaminate our
common food supply. The impact of a malicious attack can be gauged by
assessing the impact that unintentional food safety incidents have had on
both consumers and industry. As Ron just pointed out, the BSE,5 or mad
cow disease, that most of us have heard about in Britain in the 1980's
dramatically reduced the demand for beef.6 Exports were terminated and the
state producers were burdened with the cost of eradication and storage
programs; costs that continue today.
I suspect few of you noticed that in the fall of 2001, the identification of
two cases in the Japanese cattle market caused a consumption of beef to fall
55 percent within a matter of weeks. Well over a year later, it has only
recovered 75 percent to pre-crisis levels. The impact of this event was felt
around the world as producers in North America and Australia saw exports
fall. In citing this example, I am not suggesting BSE is a likely bioterrorist
agent. That is unlikely.7 My point is to demonstrate that such an attack need
not be focused directly on the consumer. In my opinion, it is just as likely to
be targeted at the food industry itself. Consumer confidence in the safety of
food supply can be undermined and real economic hurt can be generated
without actually killing people.
3

Overview of Agricultural Biosecurity, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH &

POLICY,

Jan.

27,

2003,

available at

www.cidrap.un.edu/cidrap/content/biosecurity/

ag-biosec/biofacts/agbiooview.html

4 Joe Cummins, Biopesticide and Bioweapons, INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY, Oct. 23,
2001, available at www.i-sis.org.uk/biopesticide&bioweapons.php; Leonard A. Cole, The
Specter of Biological Weapons, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Dec. 1996, at 61.
5 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Fact Sheet, UNITED NATIONS WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at www.who.int/csr/disease/bse/en/
6 Charles Hanrahan, The European Union's Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Report for Congress, RS20142, Dec. 2000, available at

www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-63.cfhi
All Egg and Egg-ContainingProducts From Beligum, France, and the Netherlands and
Animal Feed From European Countries to be Detained at Ports of Entry, FDA Talk Paper,
UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, (June 11, 1999), available at

www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00959.html
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In Belgium in 1999, the purchase of a dioxin laden animal feed
ingredient, led to a serious crisis. Livestock and poultry farms across the
continent were quarantined and products were recalled. In the end, it also led
to the defeat of a government. Let us bring it closer to home. In 1994, a
Salmonellosis incident estimated to have impacted 48 states, and perhaps
225,000 Americans, was caused by the failure of the sanitation procedures by
a trucking firm supplying inputs to a major ice cream manufacturer.8 In 1997
and in 2002, there were incidents related to E-coli at Hudson Farms and Con
Agra that resulted in the recall of millions of pounds of ground beef. 9 The
economic impact of a malicious attack on the agri-food industry could be
catastrophic. Having watched the British farm sector sustain a second
disastrous blow with the 2001 foot and mouth disease, the Canadian industry
undertook an assessment.
According to the Canadian Animal Health Coalition, the impact on
Canada would be significant.'0 A major outbreak could lead to a reduction in
Canada's GDP of approximately 2.6 percent compared to the total annual
farm contribution in 2001. A trade loss of $19.6 billion compared to five
percent of Canada's total exports from all sectors in 2001. It projected the
loss of 137,000 jobs, eradication costs of $1.2 billion, the loss of 10.3 million
animals, and finally, the dissemination of the cattle and beef industries for a
four to seven year period. In the event that Foot-and-Mouth Disease was used
by terrorists in Canada, the U.S., or Mexico it is highly likely that the
continental industry would be impacted prior to its discovery.
The specific bioterrorist examples I cited earlier also identify the range of
terrorists who have made bioterrorism their weapon of choice. The
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of
Minnesota categorizes them into the following: Terrorist groups that are
sponsored by Arabic states, such as the collapsing Iraqi regime; independent
terrorist organizations, Al Quaida; ideologically motivated groups, radical
animal rights groups; or groups that have posed genetic engineering;
offenders motivated by economic factors, those that might benefit from
sabotage." To these we must not forget to add individuals with intensely
8 Foodborne Diseases- Possibly 350 Times More Frequentthan Reported, Press Release,
Press Release, WHO/58, Aug. 13, 1997,

UNITED NATIONS WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

available at www.who.int/archives/inf-pr- 1997/en/pr97-58.html

9 Meat Recall Raises Questions About New USDA Rules, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at
B6; Calvin Woodward, Meat Recall Now Massive and Hudson Plant Shutting, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 21, 1997, availableat 1997 WL 4880532.
10 Economic Impacts of a Potential Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Canada,
Executive Summary, CANADIAN ANIMAL HEALTH COALITION, Nov. 8, 2002, available at
www.animalhealth.ca/FOOT&MOUTHEXESUMMARY.pdf
''Overview of Agricultural Biosecurity, Potential Perpetrators, CENTER FOR
INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
RESEARCH
&
POLICY,
Jan.
27,
2003, available at
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personal reasons such as disgruntlement with their employer, job loss,
jealousy or mental health problems. As Canadians and Americans, we are
not prepared to retreat to a utopian ideal of family self-sufficiency in food
production. Frankly, it is not possible to do so. Nor is it likely that we are
prepared to give up the tremendous range of products available to us
year-round in our grocery stores and restaurants.
PREVENTING BIOTERRORISM
So what are we to do? In reviewing the World Organization's paper, I
was struck by one conclusion in particular. Prevention is the first line of
defense. 2 That the key to prevention for food terrorism is establishment and
enhancement of existing food safety management programs and
implementation of reasonable security measures. In a speech to the
International Food Service Manufacturing Association in February 2003 Dr.
Murano, U.S.D.A. Under Secretary for Food Safety, talked about redefining
the farm to table continuum and in doing so used the image of the current
U.S. Inspection System as a partially opened umbrella that certainly is not
providing as much public protection as possible. 13 If prevention is the first
line of defense and our initiatives along the farm to table continuum are to be
the basis of defense of the umbrella or shield that protects us from both the
unintentional and the malicious contamination of our food supply, then today
we should carefully explore what we are doing. Just how open is the
umbrella? What are governments and industry doing to open it wider?
In the time I have left, I am going to outline some of the Canadian
initiatives to open the umbrella and to increase its effectiveness. The
Canadian farm to table continuum has recognized its fundamental
responsibility for preventing food safety problems including those related to
bioterrorism. I feel comfortable telling you this morning that Canada has a
clear commitment to this from the full supply chain. The commitment is
intense in its determination and dedication. It is the commitment that has the
support of governments at both the federal and provincial levels. It is
supported by businesses from every sector of the food chain and by their
provincial and national organizations. It is strengthened by initiatives that
link sectors along the supply chain to the point where the major organizations

www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/biosecurity/ag-biosec/biofacts/agbiooview.html
12 Terrorist Threats to Food: Guidance for Establishing and Strengthening Prevention
and Response Systems, at 11, supra note 2.
13 Elsa Murano's speech before the International Foodservice Manufacturers
Association's Chain Operators Exchange, Breaking the Cycle of Foodborne Illnesses, Feb.
24, 2003, availableat www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/speeches/2003/emcoex.htm
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have formed a new organization, the Canadian Supply Chain Food Safety
Coalition, to represent their interests and to foster initiatives.
I would like to illustrate this commitment by describing some of the
supply chain initiatives. We normally think of food chain as being on the
farm.
With the exception of important inputs like commercially
manufactured feed and chemicals, this is the case. As Under Secretary
Murano stated in the speech I mentioned earlier, consumers have a romantic
notion of heroic farmers and ranchers rising at dawn and working long hours
14
to bring a rich bounty to the dinner tables of the average American home.
That image in many respects is correct. But the tools that Canadian farmers
and ranchers are using to make the delivery to your table and mine are
increasingly guided by a rigorous scientific based approach to food safety.
On-Farm Safety Programs
Since the mid-1990's, Canadian Farm Organizations have developed
HACCP-based On-Farm Safety Programs. 15 There are 19 national programs
either under development or being implemented. Almost all meat and
poultry sectors utilize HACCP programs. In the horticultural sector, the
Canadian farm groups have developed a program for mushrooms and one for
fresh fruits and vegetables.
An On-Farm Safety Program was piloted last summer for the grains, oil
seeds, special crops and pulses and its revised revision will be in the field
again this summer. The development of national commodity specific Hazard
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) based auditable On-Farm Food
Safety Programs are the result of major collaborative efforts between farm
organizations and the Federal government. The funding partnership
established in 1997 through the Canadian On-Farm Food Safety Program to
date has invested over $15 million in government and producer funds.
Further funding has been promised under the new agricultural policy
framework for the next five years.
Before I leave the farm sector, I would like to make two points. As you
may know, Canada has a single safety agency for animal, plant, and marine
products. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency was officially launched in
1997. I will not venture into the American debate about whether a single
agency is a better way to go. Suffice it to say, it is the way that Canada has
gone, and gone successfully. The point I want to make is that as a result of
the formal agreement between the Federal Provincial Ministers of
14

id.

15 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP); See, CanadianOn-Farm Food Safety
(COFFS)Program, CANADIAN FEDERATION ON AGRICULTURE, available at www.cfa-fca.ca/

english/programs-and-projects/coffsnews/coffs-pe.pdf
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Agriculture, an agreement subsequently endorsed by the Federal Provincial
Ministers Health, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is engaged in the
unique exercise of providing official recognition to these national
HACCP-based On-Farm Safety Programs. 16 Of the 19 programs under
development, seven have already submitted their rigorous technical view,
which is the first step in obtaining recognition. This may be an indication of
things to come as the Canadian authorities expand their scope of their official
recognition program to cover the post farm gate segment of the food chain.
To my final point on the On-Farm initiatives, the national commodity
groups identified at an earlier stage that the challenge they face in providing
auditable programs to 200,000-plus farmers was well beyond the scope of
anything tackled to date. As a result, they have established and launched new
occupational On-Farm Safety Auditor and developed a five-day national
training course based on CFIA's HACCP curriculum guidelines and ISO
guidelines for auditor training. 7
So far, I have focused on the farm sector, what it is doing, its strength, its
capacity to prevent international malicious contamination of our food supply.
As I indicated earlier, the commitment in Canada is from the whole chain.
The Canadian processing sector shares many characteristics with its
American counterparts. Some plants are federally inspected and move
products across Provincial and International borders. Others are provincially
or municipally inspected and their products remain within the provincial
boundaries. HACCP is not mandatory in registered plants in Canada, except
in the fish processing plants, but it is in place. Any plant that is shipping
processed fish, meat, or poultry products south of the border is compliant
with the mandatory requirements of the relevant American legislation.
Beyond the processing sector, the food industry is rapidly moving to develop
and implement a set of national HACCP-based programs. Quite frankly, it is
following the highly successful lead of the farm sector.
In 2000, the Federal Agricultural Ministry was developing the Canadian
Food Safety Adoption Program.' 8 As of the 31st of March, this program has
funded 37 initiatives and partnerships with a wide variety of post farm gate
associations. As an initial step, each of the participants, which are national
industry associations, has undertaken the strategic review of their sector and
its current food safety activities. Through this process, the gaps have been
identified and action plans developed. As a result, major projects are being
16 Canadian On-Farm

Food Safety Program (COFFSP),

AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD

CANADA, Oct. 2003, availableat www.agr.gc.ca/card-fcadr/national initiatives/coffsp.phtml
17 Canada: a world leader in on-farm food safety, SGS CANADA, Jan. 2003, available at
www.sgs.ca/serviceSolutions/haccp/onFarnAuditor.htmi
18 Canadian Food Safety Adaptation Program (CFSAP), AGRICULTURE AND AGRI-FOOD

CANADA, Oct. 2003, availableat www.agr.gc.ca/policy/adapt/national-initiatives/cfsap.phtml
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co-sponsored by industry and government. Many of these are themselves
collaborative projects with more than one industry association contributing
expertise and financial results.
Product Traceability
Traceability is a major element in response to unintentional or malicious
food safety incidents. In Canada, there are several important initiatives
underway. On-farm and through to the processing plant, cattle traceability is
an established fact through the producer funded Canada Cattle Identification
Agency.' 9 At industry's request, its volunteer I.D. Program was made
mandatory in July of 2002. The program has already proved its value for
both animal health and food safety traceback. Other national commodity
groups are also moving in this direction. These are projects underway for
discussion in the hog, sheep, and bison sectors.
Beyond the farm gate, Canada's retail food service and food products
manufacturers have established a system of electronic traceability through
the Electronic Commerce Council of Canada, ECCnet. 20 This initiative, now
fully operational, is a web-based platform for suppliers, independent of the
size and scale of their operations, to make products available to Canadian and
foreign retailers. In itself, ECCnet is not unique. Its American equivalent,
UCCnet, and its counterparts around the world, are all functioning according
to developing a set of international standards and utilizing the expanding
capacity of information technology.2 '
From the perspective of our subject today, what is important is that since
January I s' of this year the major Canadian retailers are not accepting new
product listings unless the product data is available through ECCnet. They
are pushing out the responsibility for product identification and creating new
capacity to identify, track, and trace products in the event of an incident.
These developments, whether they are the creation and implementation of an
on-farm or post-farm gate food safety program, or the new initiatives in
traceability of primary and processed foods are important in one more
respect. I anticipate that we will see a convergence as the whole supply
chain recognizes the advantages of integrating the information technology
systems with the food safety programs. In Canada, we are on the verge of
having a new capacity to share information about food safety that well may
19 About: Rational, CANADIAN CATTLE IDENTIFICATION AGENCY (CCIA), available at

www.canadaid.com/about/rationale.shtml

20 ECCnet Canada's National Product Registry, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE COUNCIL OF

CANADA,

2003,

available

at

www.eccc.org/ProductRegistry/index.asp?langid=e&

paeid=main
Executive

Summary,
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CODE
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position us as a world leader. These initiatives by definition and practice are
filling the gaps in the food safety program.
The Canadian Agri-Industry has taken to heart the concept of food safety
being everyone's responsibility. It has engaged in an unprecedented
collaborative initiative within industry from input supplier to final marketer,
between industry at all levels and government to strengthen its capacity to
prevent both accidental and malicious food safety contamination. In my
opinion, Dr. Murano's umbrella is, in the Canadian context, being quickly
and systematically extended to cover the whole food chain.
Going back to the conclusion of the World Health Organization's report
that I quoted at the start of my presentation; it gives us a good overview of
what is happening in Canada. So far, I have dealt with taking preventative
steps with a strong food safety program. The second recommendation was to
implement reasonable security measures. With respect to bioterrorism in our
food, common food supply, this has meant several types of initiatives. In the
immediate aftermath of 9-11 and the subsequent Anthrax incidents,
governments in Canada and the United States asked businesses all along the
food chain to proactively review their security measures. Guidelines were
drafted and widely distributed by government agencies and industry
associations. The World Health Organization's new guidelines are another
example. In addition, governments responded by enhancing oversight at the
border. Canada, for example, substantially strengthens the Canadian Food
Industry Agency's point by increasing the agency budget. Strengthening
security measures to push back the borders is a sound and supportable
concept, however it must be implemented reasonably and with considerable
sensitivity. It is not to disrupt the tremendous accomplishments that have
been made creating a truly continental food market.
The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 may result in requirements that are more
restrictive than necessary to meet the Act's objectives, which I believe
Canada's food exporters and our governments fully support.2 2 It may result
in more restrictive than necessary requirements because the comment period
on the draft regulations closed last week. The proposed regulations appear to
include what could be characterized as one size fits all; minimum time to
prior notice. This approach may be problematic for the efficient and
productive movement of goods across the Canadian and United States
borders. Government and industry are urging the Food and Drug
Administration to utilize the statutory discretion to establish minimum times
that trucks related to modes of conveyance, ships, trucks, rail or aircraft, and
the nature of the commercial transaction involved. Furthermore, the
Canadian industry would like to see a consistency between the requirements
22

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, PUB.

L.No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
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of the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Customs Service as to
avoid constant disruptions and unnecessary disruptions in legitimate and
secure trade. Overall, the Canadian position is one that strongly recommends
that new measures relating to countering bioterrorism should be embedded in
the concepts endorsed by the Smart Border Initiatives. Thank you very much.

